

# Selection and Construction in the Process of Shaping Social Memory of the Phrase, “It Is No Longer ‘Postwar’”

Kazuhiko Shimizu

## Abstract

The words, “*mohaya ‘sengo’ dewanai* (it is no longer ‘postwar’),” which immediately became the popular phrase of the moment, are found in the 1956 Economic White Paper. It was a forewarning of the challenges that will emerge following the end of the economic growth spurred by postwar recovery efforts, but within the “*kuuki*” (air) of sentiments that it’s about time for the postwar period to end, a different interpretation of these words soon became mainstream. Interaction between the media and receivers since that time served in the selection/construction process of shaping collective memory, and this social memory was continuously reconstructed to become an even more comfortable narrative for the receivers to accept. Today, in 2013, it has changed to the point where it is recollected that the economic white paper had indicated Japan’s entry into a period of high economic growth following the Jinmu boom (economic boom of the mid 1950s), by loudly proclaiming “it is no longer postwar.” In this present study, the author analyzes the process of change in social memory of this phrase.

**Keywords:** social memory, collective memory, “it is no longer ‘postwar’”, “*mohaya ‘sengo’ dewanai*”, *kuuki*, selection, reconstruction, Japan 社会的記憶 集合的記憶 もはや「戦後」ではない 空気 選択 再構成 日本

## 1. Introduction: Who Constructs Social Memory?

Nearly 11 years after Japan’s defeat in World War II, on July 17, 1956, Japan’s newspapers reported in unison on the contents of the economic white paper.<sup>1</sup> At the conclusion of the review in part one, written by Yonosuke Goto, director of the research division of the Economic Planning Agency, there were the catchy words, “*mohaya ‘sengo’ dewanai* (it is no longer ‘postwar’),”<sup>2</sup> which became the popular phrase of the moment immediately after the white paper’s publication.

While there were several interpretations of this phrase from the very beginning, by the end of the year, the interaction between the media and receivers resulted in the selection of an interpretation, and resultant social memory, that differed from the intentions of Goto; this memory then underwent repetitive changes through reconstruction. The aphorism that forewarned of a harsh economic environment to follow the end of growth that had sprung from the country’s recovery from defeat in the war,<sup>3</sup> is now, in 2013, commonly accepted to have been a “song of triumph” of the bright future ahead

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\* 江戸川大学 マスコミ学科教授 メディア社会学

with Japan's emergence from the postwar era following the Jinmu boom. This study uses this phrase, "it is no longer 'postwar'," as a concrete example to show that while social memory is mediated by the media, it is, more precisely, a continuous selection and reconstruction through interaction with the receivers to shape a social memory that is acceptable and comfortable to both parties.

In considering such collective construction of memory, a valuable source of understanding is Maurice Halbwachs' theory of collective memory. Collective memory is memory of the past recollected within the framework of the group to which the individual belongs (Halbwachs 1950/1989).<sup>4</sup> This is the collectiveness of memory—an argument that sheds light on the subjective reconstruction of memory from the present time. Group identification is crucial in studies of collectiveness. This study's topic, however, concerns memory that does not have a specific group affiliation and, moreover, is mediated by the media and journalism. Although this point was not overlooked by Halbwachs, it appears that his argument was hazy and lacked clear observations. Ono, Hayashi, and Nonaka (1997: 52-54, 1999: 52-53) categorized collective memory into "group memory" (*mémoire du group*), "social memory" (*mémoire social*), and "historical memory" (*mémoire historique*) based on Halbwachs (1925, 1950) and Namer (1994: 342-343). Group memory is collective memory in the specific sense of memory that is passed down and recollected by a specific group. Social memory is expressed in newspapers, magazines, posters, paintings, popular novels, textbooks and other media with the main role played by journalism. Rather than having a specific group guide this memory, it prevails throughout society as "public opinion," "atmosphere" and "spirit." Historical memory only includes "nationally important events" and is expressed in "summarized and schematic form." It serves as a kind of marker for recollection of dates and times. Although collective memory is categorized as such into these three types, in actuality, these categories overlap each other. These terms are used in this paper because they are effective when studying not only the "senders" of information, but the "receivers," "mediators," "selection," and "interaction" as well.

This study focuses mainly on analysis of newspapers and publications, and avoids broad discussion of media as a whole.

## **2. Perspectives of Previous Research and This Study: Positioning of the Interaction between the Media and the Audience**

In studies discussing media and memory, perception of the function and impact of the media ranges from the position in which importance is placed on interaction with the information receiver to that in which emphasis is placed on the media as the information sender.

The study by Shimizu (2012, 2014) on the Miyuki-zoku<sup>5</sup> is an empirical analysis demonstrating that while the media was a mediator, it did not take an active role in constructing social memory of this youth tribe. An economic group under the framework of fashion brand VAN reconstructed the memory of the Miyuki-zoku and delivered this to the media; the media carried articles on this reconstructed memory without checking the facts; and the readers of this published memory then accepted these narratives as comfortable personal memory. As a result, the social memory of the Miyuki-zoku was reconstructed from a negative and anti-social memory to a positive one of a stylish youth culture. In this example, although the media played a role as a mediator in the process of reconstructing social memory, the

economic group under the VAN framework was the agent actively setting the direction of the reconstruction, and in addition, there was the wide presence of receivers who accepted this reshaped social memory as their own. In a manner of speaking, the main agent changing the memory, the media that mediated this memory, and the receivers of the memory were all accomplices in the change of a social memory. Hence, while the role of the media was an important one, it was not the agent that actively changed social memory.

On the other hand, from his position of placing importance on the role of the media, Sato indicates the following in *Hachigatsujugonichi no shinwa—shusenkinenbi no mediagaku* [The Myth of August 15: Media Studies on the Anniversary of the End of the Pacific War], an empirical and clear argument concerning how large of a role the media played in constructing the anniversary of the end of the war:

We position our experiences based upon "memory = history," rearranged and reconstructed by the media. The memories of people who lived in the same age cannot exist freely outside the framework of "historical memory" reconstructed by the media. . . . Memories of the individual are given meaning through documentation, monuments, novels, and TV dramas, and while incorporating the memories of the journalist himself, citations and recitations were done repeatedly, eventually resulting in the construction of the "history = memory" of the nation. (Sato 2005: 27)

Zelizer places importance on selection by the media in the reconstruction of memory, and in discussing the relation between the assassination of John F. Kennedy and the media, she concluded as follows:

The story of America's past will remain in part a story of what the media have chosen to remember, a story of how the media's memories have in turn become America's own. And if not the authority of journalists, then certainly the authority of other communities, individuals, and institutions will make their own claims to the tale. As this book has shown, it is from just such competition that history is made. (Zelizer 1992: 214)

Discourse emphasizing the selective function of media even comes from the media itself. For instance, in an article discussing national security and the propriety of torture, the chief editor of the *Asahi Shimbun* makes a paradoxical statement:

Even if this isn't kept a state secret, if it isn't taught in schools and not taken up by the mass media, much of it will disappear from people's minds. What is left depends on the vision of the state that the political powers wish to build. ("Gomon aruiwa wasurerareru rekishi" *Asahi Shimbun*, Aug. 11, 2013)

Focusing on the media as mediating collective memory, a proposal has also been made for a new concept of media memory, with "we propose to view the shift from *On Collective Memory* to *On Media Memory* as part of the larger process of expanding the scope of memory studies and tracing the ways in

which memory studies interface with related fields of scholarship" (Neiger et al. 2011: 4).

In this way, views on the involvement of the media in the construction of social memory differ in intensity, from the perspective placing importance on the interaction between the players involved in the construction of social memory, to that emphasizing the function of selection by the media as the information sender. It is true that mediation by the media is necessary for the construction of social memory. However, memory selected and constructed unilaterally and actively by the media is not always accepted as social memory. Even if the media constructs a memory, unless this is one that is comfortable and readily embraced by the information receivers, it will not be accepted and thus will not become social memory. The interaction between the media (the senders) and the readers (receivers) cannot be ignored.

Moreover, the media are private, profit-pursuing companies, and for the print media, be they newspapers or magazines, the goal of business is to increase circulation. That being the case, articles = memories are reconstructed in a manner acceptable to readers. In order to ensure the permanence of business, demands are placed for interaction to take a form in which the media can get on the good side of their readers.<sup>6</sup>

This study places importance on the interaction between the senders and receivers, and does not take the perspective that the media is the main agent in the construction of social memory. More precisely, it is thought that social memory, while being mediated by the media, is constructed within an ambiguous environment known as society.

### 3. "It Is No Longer 'Postwar'" in 1956: Selection by Ambiguity and "Kuuki"

#### 3.1 Three interpretations: Forewarning, deception, triumph

Several different directions were seen even within the same media in their appraisal of the economic white paper, which was, at that time, a novel and difficult-to-understand publication<sup>7</sup>. Focus was also placed on its catchy phrase, "*mohaya 'sengo' dewanai* (it is no longer 'postwar')." This was a forewarning that a painful modernization will be essential following the end of the unique economic situation of the postwar recovery period,<sup>8</sup> but there was confusion over the interpretation of this phrase from the start. The words became the phrase of the moment and were taken out of context<sup>9</sup>, generating several interpretations that differed from that intended by the author of the report.

At that time, three interpretations of the phrase, "it is no longer 'postwar,'" coexisted. These interpretations can be categorized as the following (1) to (3). One more interpretation appeared in the 1980s. This will be explained in section 4.2.

(1) Interpretation as a forewarning that a painful modernization will be essential following the end of economic growth under the unique economic situation of the postwar period (hereinafter referred to as "forewarning").

(2) Interpretation as a "deception" that the postwar period is over although the distressing circumstances following the war have not yet come to an end. Here, this phrase is not limited to economy but is perceived in a broad and general sense (hereinafter referred to as "deception").

(3) Interpretation as a "song of triumph" in that Japan, which has recovered from the war, has a bright future ahead of it (hereinafter referred to as "triumph").

The frequent appearance of "triumph" in the newspapers was about one month behind that of "forewarning" and "deception," but here, the relation between "deception" and "triumph" must be noted. If there was no concept of "triumph," there will be no "deception," as "deception" was criticism of the concept of "triumph." So while there were few "triumph" articles in the media in the beginning, the "deception" articles suggest that "triumph" existed. Furthermore, there is a matter that must be considered without overlooking it as merely a matter of rhetoric. In the economic white paper, quotation marks in the phrase are set around "postwar." This is because the unique economic situation in the postwar period is underscored by the one word, "postwar." But from immediately after the publication of the white paper, a striking number of citations removed the quotation marks from "postwar." Removing the quotation marks changes the word from its narrow sense to a broad and general one that implies vague social conditions encompassing postwar economy, livelihoods, society, culture, social customs and trends, politics, and so on.<sup>10</sup>

The phrase, "it is no longer 'postwar,'" was an expression pregnant with multiplicity from the time of its publication. This was the very situation noted by Sturken (1997: 7):

The degree to which memories are "faithful" to original experiences is difficult to ascertain. What we remember is highly selective, and how we retrieve it says as much about desire and denial as it does about remembrance.

All memories are "created" in tandem with forgetting; to remember everything would amount to being overwhelmed by memory. Forgetting is a necessary component in the construction of memory.

The situation noted in the summarization of Sturken's arguments by Neiger et al. would likely apply:

The selection/construction process of shaping collective memory is ongoing and it involves political, cultural, and sociological confrontations, as different interpreters compete over the place of their reading of the past in the public arena (Struken, 1997) . . . the multitude of existing media channels and outlets offer a variety of genres that address the construction/selection question in different and often opposing ways. (Neiger et al 2011: 7)

In the case of the words, "it is no longer 'postwar,'" not only were the newspapers asserting their respective interpretations within the large arena of the newspaper media as a whole, but each newspaper itself was an arena for the battle over interpretations. The forces of the selection/construction process of shaping collective memory came into action with the announcement of the economic white paper.

### **3.2 The "kuuki" of "it's about time for the postwar period to end" and the selection of memory**

Let's now turn to specific examples of "forewarning," "deception," and "triumph."

Articles holding a "forewarning" interpretation include those introducing an outline of the economic white paper such as "Economic White Paper' announced by the Economic Planning Agency" (*Asahi Shimbun*, July 17, 1956) and "Economic White Paper Announced by the Economic Planning Agency" (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 17, 1956). Because there is no evaluation involved, the "forewarning" is left intact in the articles. An *Asahi Shimbun* editorial comments:

This declares an end to the postwar economy way of thinking . . . It could be said that its recommendation to cast off the custom of blaming everything on the war and to set forth a direction for the creation of a new force driving economic development is par for the course in view of not only the domestic economy but the basic trend of international economy. (*Asahi Shimbun*, July 17, 1956)

The *Mainichi Shimbun* editorial also notes that the white paper says that, "The age of the postwar economy has come to an end. We must proceed to [build] a new economy" (*Mainichi Shimbun*, July 18, 1956).<sup>11</sup> Not only the newspapers, but a journal issued by a think tank also says, "This aphorism needs to be understood as a forewarning, and not simply derided as a fad expression like the [popular term for socially defiant youth] Taiyo-zoku." (*Keizai Chosa*, Daiwa Research Institute, Daiwa Bank, August 1956: 3).

An example of "deception" is:

"Economy" is connected to the daily lifting and lowering of our chopsticks, in other words, it is our "everyday lives" . . . with the public still unable to escape from the desperate life forced upon them because of the war, I fail to understand why only the "economy" is "no longer postwar." (Yasuji Hanamori<sup>12</sup>, "Keizai hakusho o yonde Baka ni shinasanna [After reading the economic white paper: Don't mock me] ", *Asahi Shimbun*, July 17, 1956)

Another example is:

The recently released white paper on welfare and health<sup>13</sup> questions whether the "postwar" has really ended, indicating "social distortions" in the conditions of people's lives . . . Seeing how there are far too many in the low-income class who were left behind in the recovery, it certainly cannot be said that "the postwar period has ended." (Vox Populi, *Asahi Shimbun*, Oct. 9, 1956)

Regarding "triumph," the number of articles at the time of the white paper's publication was not striking. But this situation changed in less than a month, and by the end of the year, it became the mainstream interpretation. The process of change in the interpretation presented by the media also means a change in how the information receivers wished to accept the meaning of the phrase. Articles in the *Yomiuri Shimbun* will be taken up here to demonstrate the changes that occurred. But this does not mean that the perspectives of "forewarning" and "deception" disappeared. This looks at the process of how "triumph," though running behind at first, caught up with and surpassed the other two.

In the initial stage in July 20, an article appeared, which, while implying to some extent an

interpretation other than "forewarning" or "deception," does not show a clear direction:

Indeed, even the author of the book, Shintaro [Ishihara]<sup>14</sup>, writes that "since it seems that they are trying to make everything my responsibility, even the contorted make [of the movie], in self-defense I cannot remain silent" (*Mainichi Shimbun*). It will soon be the 12th time for August 15 to come around. It seems like "it is no longer postwar." Now may be the time for us to stop being appalled by the youth culture appearing after the war and viewing them as strange beasts. (Yomiuri Sunpyo, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 20, 1956)

One month later there appeared a "triumph" article stating, "the 10th economic white paper loudly declared the end to the 'postwar' period, saying 'it is no longer postwar'" (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 12, 1956), and a "deception" article stating, "Tokyo is back on its feet. Recovery is at a level where even the government white paper can declare that 'there is no postwar' (*sic*). However, this is just superficial, and the lives of the general public have not changed much" (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 14, 1956; 'there is no postwar' is most probably a typographical error). On the next day, an article taking only the "triumph" perspective was printed:

"It is no longer postwar": Another piece of proof? Smack in the middle of Tokyo, the building at the Sukiyabashi intersection (photo right) boasts the restoration of electric power with illuminations as bright as daylight.

. . . The scenic outer moat, reflecting these lights, will be filled in to allow an expressway building to be built, eventually disappearing along with the bridge featured in "*Kimi no na wa*."<sup>15</sup> This is the land of the sun, shining brilliantly with rows of buildings. (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 15, 1956)

As can be seen in the following, by autumn, articles began to change into unhesitant "songs of triumph" based on the premise that "triumph" was becoming the social memory. "Today, with economic recovery roughly achieved, the view has even been expressed that 'it is no longer postwar'" (Editorial, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Nov. 19, 1956). At the end of the year, "Lately, there has been fantastic growth in Japan's production and trade . . . this period is truly 'not postwar'" (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, Dec. 14, 1956), and:

The Japanese war criminals detained in the Soviet Union, a large scar left from the war, were able to welcome in the New Year in their hometowns, making this a year that gave us a solid sense that "it is no longer postwar," (words taken from this year's 'Economic White Paper' announced by the Economic Planning Agency). (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, Dec. 31, 1956)

In this way, pivoting around August 15, the anniversary of the end of the war, it can be seen that "triumph" was becoming established as social memory.

The reason that can be given for this is that a public sentiment, spirit of the times, atmosphere, or, to put it into one word, a "*kuuki* (air)"<sup>16</sup> encouraging the distortion of the phrase into one of "triumph" was created by "August journalism,"<sup>17</sup> which, prevalent since the 1955 tenth anniversary of the end of the war,

helped build public opinion for putting an end to the postwar period, and by the economy, which, contrary to projections by the economic white paper, was booming from 1956 to early 1957<sup>18</sup>. Selection was, in the sense of presenting various interpretations, an act of the information senders. However, the social memory of "triumph" was constructed through selection that resulted from interaction with the information receivers.<sup>19</sup>

In later analysis of the *kuuki* that existed at that time, Kanamori states:

In any case, by around 1956, a sense that the "postwar was over" was latent within everyone. However, although this was latent, the general public was not clearly aware of this. It was within such a situation that Mr. Goto threw in these words, causing the public to realize this feeling. (Kanamori, Aug. 27, 1986: 73)

and the *Asahi Shimbun* writes:

The economic white paper's "it is no longer postwar" became a fad phrase. It probably matched public sentiment that it's about time for the postwar period to come to an end. (*Asahi Shimbun*, April 5, 1986)

This ambiguous *kuuki* set the direction for interactions between the media and audience.

## 4. Changes in the Reconstruction of the "Triumph" Story after 1956

### 4.1 Modernization replaced by the Jinmu boom

The selection process for "it is no longer 'postwar'" was over by around the end of 1956, becoming a social memory of "triumph." Almost one year later, it was written that "last year's white paper had a cheerful tenor, saying 'the postwar recovery of our nation's economy has ended. We must now work for modernization.'" (*Asahi Shimbun*, July 19, 1957), and two years later, this became "It is no longer postwar' may apply economically, but psychologically, the scars are expanding" (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, Sept. 8, 1958). In this way, articles were written on the premise of a social memory of "triumph," with the only difference being whether the article's view was negative or positive.

Entering the 60s, even in statements taking an ideological and critical position, it can be confirmed that social memory of the "triumph" interpretation was established:

In the conclusion [of the white paper] it was said that "it is no longer 'postwar'," and this became the phrase of the moment. These words were often heard in self-praise of our country's monopolistic capital, boasting of the completion of postwar recovery and heralding new growth. (Kobayashi 1963: 118-119)

In a feature story in *Heibon Punch*, which looked at patriotism in 1964 based on a diary retrieved from the artifacts of a Japanese soldier who fought in World War II, it is stated:

Japan today is in an era that is referred to as 'no longer postwar.'

In Tokyo, the flamboyant XVIII Games of the Olympiad are underway. The scars of war have been wiped away, and cannot be found anywhere. This makes us prone to forgetting about the tragedy of war. ("Sokoku no wakai hito yo, utsukushikuare: kimi wa nihonhei ga nokoshita nikki o do omou? [Youth of our nation, be noble: What do you think about the 'diary' left by the Japanese soldier?]" *Heibon Punch*, October 19, 1964: 42)

In 1965, Hidezo Inaba writes:

The Japanese economic conversion theory and precautionary view that stands on the perspective of "it is no longer postwar," which was introduced in the previous issue [as a "forewarning"] was easily defeated by the reality of high economic growth coming from the Jinmu boom and Iwato boom, but it was argued with quite a great deal of force up until around 1957-58. We were working hard to assert this. (Inaba, Feb. 1, 1965: 86)

The collective memory of the group of specialists under the framework of economy was one of "forewarning," and this was actively proclaimed until around 1957-58, but it can be seen that they were no longer "working hard" to argue for this by the mid 60s.<sup>20</sup>

Entering the 70s, the *Asahi Shimbun* took up the economic white papers of 1947, 1956, and 1970, and unabashedly extolled Japan's economic might by writing, "Japanese economy dashed up the road to high growth" (Aug. 15, 1970). According to the article, in 1947, Japan was still mired in financial, corporate, and household deficits, but in 1956, quoting the economic white paper, "It is no longer postwar. Growth through recovery has ended. From now on, growth will be supported by modernization," and supported by modernization, in 1970, in the midst of Japan's longest period of economic growth, it had become an economic power of such a size that it was derided as an economic animal. But as of 1956, it was not known if Japan would enter a period of high economic growth or if it would be able to achieve modernization. Although the economic white paper had rung warning bells over a painful modernization, here it was written as if the paper had declared that modernization would come automatically. Within the experience of high economic growth<sup>21</sup> the "forewarning" was, as in the words of Inaba, "easily defeated."

After the mid 80s, the phrase, "it is no longer 'postwar,'" frequently appears in combination with words that have connotations of glorification such as "proclaimed" and "loudly extolled."<sup>22</sup> In addition, the Jinmu boom<sup>23</sup> replaced modernization to be linked with the phrase, "it is no longer 'postwar,'" changing social memory to one in which Japan entered the Jinmu boom and it was no longer postwar.

Following the Jinmu boom in 1956, the year in which the phrase, "it is no longer postwar," was extolled by the economic white paper, and then the Iwato boom of 1959, and the Izanagi boom of 1969, Japan became the second largest economic power among the free nations. (*Asahi Shimbun*, Aug. 18, 1985)

"It is no longer postwar" was loudly proclaimed in the 1956 economic white paper. Japanese economy steadily accomplished high growth while going through the waves of the Jinmu boom,

lingering recession, and Iwato boom. (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, Jan. 9, 1989)

As in these examples, writings that loosely link the phrase, "it is no longer 'postwar'," and the Jinmu boom began to appear. During the same period, articles linking modernization and "it is no longer 'postwar'" began to decrease.<sup>24</sup>

In the 90s, the phrase, "it is no longer 'postwar'," and the Jinmu boom began to show a clear link, and the logic was reconstructed to that in which Japan was no longer in the postwar period due to the Jinmu boom. The *Yomiuri Shimbun* goes straight to the point, writing, "After going through the Jinmu boom (1955-56), 'it is no longer postwar' was proclaimed by the economic white paper (1956)" (November 24, 1992). In 2013, the high school Japanese history textbook *Shosetsu nihonshi* [Detailed explanation of Japanese history] (approved by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in 2012), published by Yamakawa Shuppan,<sup>25</sup> also notes that "with the advent of the large economic period called the Jinmu boom from 1955-57, the words 'it is no longer postwar' appeared in the fiscal 1956 economic white paper by the Economic Planning Agency" (394). Here, the words, "it is no longer postwar," were highlighted in bold print.<sup>26</sup>

## 4.2 Collective memory as a marker of time

After "it is no longer 'postwar'" became a social memory of "triumph," in the 80s a new fourth interpretation focusing on the historical memory aspect appeared:

(4) Interpreted as a kind of "marker" to recollect a specific date or time (hereinafter referred to as "marker")

Examples of "marker" include, "This was around 1956, when the economic white paper said 'it is no longer postwar'" (*Asahi Shimbun*, Jan. 1, 1985) and "The discovery of Minamata disease goes back to 1956, the year the economic white paper wrote 'it is no longer postwar'" (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, Aug. 9, 1994). In the latter case, the phrase, "it is no longer postwar," has no meaning in itself and is used as a marker of time to indicate when Minamata disease was first discovered.

## 4.3 Audience comfort and media convenience

Why is "triumph" virtually the only social memory to be reconstructed over the years? When receiving collective memory mediated by the media, the receivers, after experiencing an economic boom that was not predicted in the economic white paper, either rejected or forgot memories that refuted the comfortable social memory of the postwar period ending with Japan's entry into the period of high economic growth.<sup>27</sup> The interaction between the media and the information receivers continued to reconstruct social memory in a direction that was comfortable for the receivers. Rather than recollecting the phrase as a "forewarning," it is more comfortable to recollect this as a "triumph" for Japan with the end of the postwar period and the start of the high growth.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, rather than an abstract concept such as modernization, the Jinmu boom provided a more concrete image for easy recollection and empathy.

A reason also lies in how the media works. When a media takes up a matter that had been taken up

in the past, journalists look at past issues. This is because only limited time is available to prepare the article, and consistency needs to be maintained in the media's position. The media will not gain the confidence of its readers if its position or value judgments vacillate within a short period of time. As a result, the social memory goes on to be reconstructed from the previously constructed social memory, at times, using the exact same expression, or with the addition of just a change in rhetoric.<sup>29</sup> As noted by Berkowitz:

Journalists are often faced with telling news of the unusual and unexpected, yet they must report on tight deadlines with little information. One device that journalists can draw on to get their job done is collective memory of society's revered events and people. Collective memory allows news to gain a semblance of the familiar — journalists are able to tell their stories in a way that seems resonant to both news organization and news audiences. In essence, through collective memory, their version gains authority as *the* version. (Berkowitz 2011 : 201)<sup>30</sup>

Then again, the mass media is also a commercial media. The purpose of publishing newspapers and magazines is to maximize the profits of the publisher. For those working in the editorial departments, this means selling as many issues as possible. If several perspectives happen to be printed regarding a certain incident, these perspectives will converge in a direction that is able to receive the support of the readers. Securing circulation, or in other words, profit, is comfortable for the media as well.

Meanwhile, the memories of "forewarning" and "deception" have not been completely forgotten. These memories are transferred to the storage memory (Assmann 2007)<sup>31</sup>, seemingly forgotten on the surface, but at times, they move to the functional memory (Assmann 2007) and reappear as articles. Memories of "forewarning" and "deception" sporadically appear in the media like an air balloon monitoring the "*kuuki*" of the receivers.

As an example of "forewarning," in the 70s, Yukio Akatsuka, in discussing various popular trends, used this phrase in the sense of "triumph" preceding the "golden 60s," but in the same review he also provided explanation from the perspective of "forewarning" (Akatsuka Feb. 1973: 20-21). Entering the 90s, it was noted:

The phrase, "it is no longer 'postwar'," is a famous phrase, which was written in the economic white paper in July 1956, but this originally meant that "almost all the buoyancy from economic recovery has been depleted now," namely, these were words of warning, and were not a declaration of triumph that Japan has finally been able to escape from the bad currents known as the postwar. However, as words will always be taken out of context, we should now just totally compromise and understand this to mean that we were able to overcome difficult and trying times. (Tanizawa 1992: 122-123)

It can be seen that the phrase, "it is no longer 'postwar'," was such a solid social memory it could not be argued without "total compromise." In 2013 as well, it was noted that "it is no longer postwar' was a forewarning urging independence" (*Nikkei*, March 10, 2013).

As an example of "deception," there is also discourse tending toward ideology:

Around the time of revision to the US-Japan Security Treaty, the slogan, "it is no longer postwar," began to be used among the government and some scholars and critics, but contrary to the meaning that those people were trying to convey, those words were touching on the truth. Yes, it is no longer "postwar." It is a new "pre-war." No, you could even say that we are now already "in war." (Hayashida 1965: 44)

In addition, there is an article based on individual experience:

In 1956, the economic white paper proclaimed, "it is no longer postwar," but when I was visiting relatives in Yokohama after coming to Tokyo, the scars of war were still evident in the city, the company housing built on the factory site along the beach had no individual baths, and the communal bath was mixed bathing. I was totally taken by surprise when a woman appeared saying, "good evening."

My first place living away from home was a three-tatami mat room in Azumacho (now Kyojima) in Sumida Ward, which was partitioned by a fusuma sliding door. In a kitchen shared by six families (I was the only single person) I would cook on a portable clay cooking stove, and was always hungry. (Renichi Kita, "Showa sanjunendai wa yokatta ka [Were the mid 50s to early 60s really a good age]", *Yomiuri Shimbum*, Feb. 14, 2007)

But these memories did not have an effect on the reconstruction of social memory, and fell back again into the storage memory. Today, in 2013, there are hardly any "forewarning" or "deception" articles. They are not able to compete against the social memory of "triumph." In the past one year, between August 2012 and July 2013, a total of 31 articles using the phrase, "it is no longer 'postwar'," appeared in the five newspapers of *Asahi*, *Yomiuri*, *Mainichi*, *Sankei*, and *Nikkei*.<sup>32</sup> Of these articles, one was a "forewarning," two were "deception," and 22 were "triumph." Six articles were "markers." In the social memory of today, "it is no longer 'postwar'" is a "song of triumph" of Japan's successful recovery and the bright future ahead, and its use as a marker indicating a specific period of time is also increasing.

In this way, during the process of repeated reconstruction of the phrase, "it is no longer 'postwar'," as a "song of triumph" of Japan's successful recovery and of the bright future ahead, in order to become a more persuasive and more easily accepted narrative for the audiences, it was bonded to the Jinmu boom as an "afterthought" memory to become a more familiar and comfortable social memory.

## 5. Conclusion and Future Topics to Address

This paper analyzed the process of reconstruction and change in the social memory of the phrase, "it is no longer 'postwar'." When the economic white paper was published, "it is no longer 'postwar'" was interpreted as a "forewarning" or a "deception," but within the "*kuuki*" of "it's about time for the postwar period to end," the interaction between the information senders and receivers soon added the interpretation of these words as a "triumph," with "triumph" rapidly overtaking "forewarning" and "deception." The media served as the arena for this selection/construction process of shaping collective memory, and the selected social memory of "it is no longer 'postwar'" continued to undergo

reconstruction through interaction with the information receivers. The painful modernization, which was supposed to be essential, was forgotten and was replaced by the Jinmu boom. Combined with the Jinmu boom, social memory changed to the point where it is recollected that after going through the Jinmu boom, "it is no longer postwar" was loudly proclaimed by the economic white paper. By undergoing repetitive reconstruction, social memory becomes a narrative that is more comfortably accepted by the audience. This is because the constructed memory will not function unless the audience accepts it. In addition, writing a story that is easily accepted would also be in the interests of the media itself. In this way, the social memory of "it is no longer 'postwar'" was changed through the interaction between the media and audience.

However, as only the outlines of the mechanism of interaction between the media and the audience are discussed in this paper, to analyze this in detail remains a topic to be addressed. In addition, in this study, the media was limited to newspapers and publications. It would be necessary to add to this study the other players who mediate the construction of social memory, including conventional media such as TV and radio, as well as SNS, where the receivers are at the same time the senders of information. This is because, although "it is no longer 'postwar'" is a phrase from over half a century ago, so long as its social memory continues to be reshaped, the challenge of more study remains.

## Notes

Unless otherwise noted, all English translations of the Japanese are my own.

- 1 The official name is *Annual Economic Report* but it is generally called the economic white paper. This study will also use this general name. Unless otherwise noted, the economic white paper is the 1956 edition. The phrase, "*mohaya 'sengo' dewanai* (it is no longer 'postwar')," appeared in the following quotation from the white paper. The underline is added by Shimizu:

Almost all the buoyancy from economic recovery has been depleted now. Because Japan is a poor country compared to the other countries of the world, it might still have a high potential demand for consumption and investment, but compared to a transient period after the war, this furious desire has clearly waned. It is no longer 'postwar.' We are now about to face a different situation. Growth from recovery has ended. Future growth will be supported by modernization. And the advancement of modernization as well is only possible through swift and stable economic growth.

The assimilation of new things is always met with resistance. It may appear as if the contradictions of the economic systems that lag behind are intensified even more due to modernization. But in the long term, the contradictions of small and medium-sized companies, labor, agriculture and other aspects can only be absorbed through the development of the economy. If modernization is the only direction for the national economy to take, the burdens that arise from its implementation must be shared among the citizens according to their strengths.

Modernization – transformation – is the process of remaking oneself. This is an operation that cannot be implemented without pain. (Economic Planning Agency ed. 1956: 42-43)

- 2 This phrase was taken from the paper "Mohaya 'sengo' dewanai [It is no longer 'postwar']" (Nakano, Feb. 1956: 56-66) published in *Bungeishunju* (Kanamori 1986: 73). Just as Goto had planned, "it is no longer 'postwar'" became a phrase on everyone's lips. According to the *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Sept. 4, 1994) the three fad phrases of 1956 were "*Taiyo-zoku* ('sun tribe' of postwar youth), *mohaya sengo dewanai* (it is no longer postwar) and *ichioku sohakuchika* (the dumbing down of 100 million people)."
- 3 Inaba, a friend of Yonosuke Goto who held him in high regard, shared his views of the economic situation at the time the economic white paper was written. He notes the following points as the unique situation of the postwar economy: Japan had industrial facilities that could be restored; was able to reconstruct social infrastructure at low costs; was able to hire highly skilled labor and engineers at low wages; saw its exports rise; received aid from the United States; was able to invest as imports surpassed exports due to the special procurement boom from the Korean War (Inaba, "Mohaya sengo dewanai" ronso (jyo), *Jitsugyo no Nihon*, Jitsugyo no Nihon Sha, Jan. 15, 1965: 94).
- Regarding the social memory of the landscape after defeat in the war, it is noted that "The war turned Japan into a state where towns and factories were reduced to ashes" ([http://www.php-fc.com/report/2011/10/post\\_416.php](http://www.php-fc.com/report/2011/10/post_416.php) accessed Aug. 13, 2013), but taking Tokyo for an example, according to "Yakenohara no anohi no Tokyo [The burnt fields of Tokyo on that day]" (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, Aug. 15, 1956), 56 percent of the houses were burned by the air raids, and according to the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of City Planning, "the total area damaged was 195 km<sup>2</sup>, 28 percent of Tokyo's ward area, and the number of houses burned was 710,000, half of the houses in the ward area" (1989: 46). With regard to production facilities, "most of the large factories owned by major enterprises remained" (Irokawa 1991:91). There was sufficient economic power to accommodate the special procurement demand from the Korean War and to use this as a springboard. But even Inaba, in reflection, admits that he "underestimated" the economic capability of Japan in the postwar recovery period (Inaba, Jan. 15, 1965: 94). How the social memory of building from zero after the war (Miwa 2010: 182, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry [http://www.hkd.meti.go.jp/hokpw/h22p\\_program/sho6\\_04.pdf](http://www.hkd.meti.go.jp/hokpw/h22p_program/sho6_04.pdf) (accessed Aug. 29, 2013)) was constructed goes beyond the realms of this study, but is a topic that should perhaps be discussed at another time.
- 4 Halbwachs, carrying on the collectivism tradition of Émile Durkheim, rejected much of the theories of memory typified by Henri-Louis Bergson's view of memory as an individual phenomenon, and considered memory as a collective phenomenon (Coser 1992). The presentism aspect of Halbwachs' collective memory had an affinity with structuralism, and was reappraised from the 1980s. However, with regard to the structuralism aspect, there are arguments that Halbwachs was also emphasizing the reality of the past (Kin 2010). Currently, his work is taken up in a variety of disciplines, such as archaeology, religion, history, sociology, and cognitive psychology (refer to Hama 2000, Nora 2002, Katagiri 2003, Matsuura 2005, Assmann 2007, Mizoi 2009, Ohta and Itsukushima 2011, etc.). Halbwachs' key points are: 1) the collectiveness of memory; 2) subjective reconstruction of memory from the present; 3) group attribution of memory; and 4) repetitive reconstruction of memory. This is now also often mentioned in media research as well (Neiger et al., eds. 2011, Sturken 1997), and when done so, 5) the selectiveness of memory by the media, is added as a point for discussion.

- 5 In the summer of 1964, a group of youth gathered around a street called Miyuki-dori in the upper-end shopping district of Ginza, Tokyo. They were called the Miyuki-zoku after the name of the street, and became the subject of public concern. After the mid 80s the social memory of this group was reconstructed to that in which the Miyuki-zoku wore fashion brand VAN clothing and were popularized by *Heibon Punch*.
- 6 For instance, Tsuneo Kita, President of Nikkei Inc., states in his message on the English website that, "In carrying out our multi-platform news media strategy, we strive to provide content and services tailored to the various needs of our readers," ending the message with "I would like to pledge Nikkei's commitment to becoming a truly global media organization and to making every effort to provide our readers exactly the kind of information they want" (<http://www.nikkei.co.jp/nikkeiinfo/english/company/> (accessed Aug. 16, 2013)). The company's rules of conduct outline "observing" "proper reporting" for the "provision of accurate information" (<http://www.nikkei.co.jp/nikkeiinfo/company/conduct.html> (accessed Aug. 16, 2013)), but this is not the same as deciding what "accurate information" should be selected and reported in order to meet readers needs.
- 7 In response to criticism that "the terminology of modern economics and the complicated wording found throughout the report make this very difficult to approach" ("Chikayorigatai yashinsaku", Yomiuri Shimbun, July 17, 1956), Yonosuke Goto, the author of the economic white paper, wrote an article for the *Asahi Shimbun* under his name titled, "Keizai hakusho hihan ni kotaeru: Bunsho mo yasashikusuruyo tsutomemasu [Reply to criticism toward the economic white paper: I will strive to make the wording easier]" (*Asahi Shimbun*, July 23, 1956).
- 8 The source of this phrase is Nakano, who did not use the words, "it is no longer 'postwar'" in the economic sense. He states, "What I mean by the end of 'postwar' is that it is now about time for us to put an end to our easy dependence on 'postwar.' For instance, in the case of reaction to the lessons of defeat in the war, reactions that are simply emotional, both good or bad, are not enough, and are even meaningless" (Nakano 1956: 58). He outlines a specific way to end this dependence on the postwar, with the three subtitles of "Take a rational stance in matters between countries," "Youth who have the character to shoulder the next generation," and "Accept that Japan's a small country now." Here, an arrogant stance in loudly proclaiming a break with the past, the end of postwar recovery and the return of confidence, is not seen at all.

Nakano's meaning of dependence on the postwar was used by Goto in an interpretation limited to the economic aspects of "growth through recovery," in other words, the unique economic situation of postwar recovery. Today (in 1956) where "buoyancy from recovery of the economy" is gone, "economic growth will slow down," and "a distinct business cycle will appear," argues Goto ("Keizai hakusho hihan ni kotaeru", *Asahi Shimbun*, July 23, 1956). In order to address the new phase of economic slowdown, he asserts that modernization that "will not come without pain" would be indispensable. In short, "it is no longer 'postwar'" was a forewarning.

After "it is no longer 'postwar'" became a fad phrase, Nakano remonstrated as follows: "It's already been about two or three years since the phrase, 'it is no longer postwar,' became a catch

phrase among some parts of society. In recent years, no phrase has been set within such an unfortunate misinterpretation as this" (Aug. 1958:78).

- 9 For example, an education-related magazine had an article with the title, "Jihyo zadankai: mohaya sengo dewanai. Deha...? [Review: It is no longer postwar. Then what is it...?]" (Nihon Seikatsu Kyoiku Renmei, *Curriculum*, Seibundo Shinkosha, Dec. 1956: 42), but there was no mention of the economic white paper. Distressed about the state of reactionary educational administration, it was concerned only with the issue of amending the local educational administration law, stating, "It is no longer postwar is a fad phrase of late, and it is true, it is not postwar . . . it is absolutely 'prewar'."
- 10 For example, Gluck states that the word "postwar" for Japan shoulders many meanings, and categorizes them into five groups for study (2007: 324-331).
- 11 There were also counterarguments based on the interpretation that "it is no longer 'postwar'" is a "forewarning," such as, "This is a 'new theory' enthusiastically put forward by the Economic Planning Agency that economic growth will slow down and a distinct business cycle will appear, but there are many scholars and economic critics who are not convinced" (*Asahi Shimbun*, July 17, 1956).
- 12 Hanamori was the chief editor of *Kurashi no Techo*, a progressive and pacifist magazine. It is noted that "It is believed that self-criticism toward his wartime 'involvement in propaganda as a member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association up until the defeat in the war' (Hanamori 2012: colophon) led him to position himself with the common people. 'It is true that I committed war crimes. If I can justify myself, let me say that I did not know what was going on at that time, that I was deceived. But I do not think this can be forgiven. I will never be deceived again. I will work to increase the number of people who will not be deceived. I believe that this commitment and sense of mission is granting me at least a stay of execution for my past crimes' (*Shukan Asahi*, Nov. 19, 1971) . . . The reason why Hanamori did not speak about his cooperation with the Imperial Rule Assistance Association during the war is probably because he was fixated on this point" (Sakai 1988: 219-220).
- 13 *1956 Health and Welfare White Paper* of October 5, 1956, "Chapter 1: Protection of Citizen's Lives, Section 1: How are the lives of the citizens? Has the 'postwar' really ended?"
- 14 Shintaro Ishihara won the 34th Akutagawa Prize for his novel *Taiyo no kisetsu* [Season of the Sun] (Shinchosha 1956), which depicted youth in postwar Japan. It was a bestseller, which was immediately adapted as a movie, and was considered problematic for its bad influence on youth due to its portrayal of sex, which went beyond the social norms of the time.
- 15 A popular war melodrama staged on the bridge, Sukiwabashi. It was broadcasted over the radio from 1952 to 1954.
- 16 "*Kuuki*" is "an atmosphere that applies pressure in a certain direction" (Ito 2013: 32), and is one of the

key factors urging on change in social memory. "*Kuuki*" acts in micro environments such as one-to-one interaction between people and small groups, and also in macro environments such as the entire nation. In macro environments, the mass media can be affected by *kuuki* and can also create *kuuki*. The *kuuki* phenomenon is not necessarily unique to Japan, but is universal, with similar phenomenon seen in western societies as well. But there is no one convenient word in western societies that can wholly express these concepts in one word like "*kuuki*." Taking note of the convenience of this word, *kuuki* has been taken up as an independent entry in dictionaries and encyclopedias in the West from about a decade ago (Ito 2006, 2010, 2013). Littlejohn and Foss (2009: 573) have made an independent entry for "Japanese Kuuki Theory," with it stated that "Kuuki, the Japanese linguistic equivalent of *air*, refers to the *atmosphere of a situation* to which all those involved are expected to pay respect..." Watson and Hill (2003: 153) also have an entry on "kuuki."

- 17 "Media alignment for this kind of end-of-the-war show, with a style that continues up to the present day, was established in 1955" (Sato 2005: 112). A change appeared in reports concerning the war from 1955. This was the establishment of "August journalism" as a regular summer feature, starting with the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, and peaking with the anniversary of the end of the war on August 15. "In 1955, each media made "the 10th anniversary of the end of the war" a new tradition, and "August journalism" began in earnest from 1956, the following year" (Sato 2005: 116). "Indeed, from the August 6 Atomic Bomb Day of Hiroshima to the August 15 'Day for Mourning the War Dead and Praying for Peace,' with the August 9 Atomic Bomb Day of Nagasaki in between, 'August journalism,' looking back on the war, became a tradition for newspapers and magazines and TV" (Sato 2005: 129).
- 18 As one example, "Kotoshi mokemashita: kokeiki no kamikaze [A profitable year: the divine wind of a booming economy] (*Shukan Shincho*, Dec. 27, 1956: 26-32).
- 19 The media was motivated to select an interpretation that would boost circulation. This was decided through interaction with the readers.
- 20 It could be said that Noelle-Neumann's spiral of silence (2013) applies to this quote.
- 21 From 1956 to 1973, just before the oil shock, the real economic growth rate averaged 9.4 percent (calculated from [http://www.teikokushoin.co.jp/statistics/history\\_civics/index23.html](http://www.teikokushoin.co.jp/statistics/history_civics/index23.html) (accessed Aug. 11, 2013)).
- 22 Using the Nikkei BP news search service, the words "*mohaya 'senjo' dewanai* (it's no longer 'postwar')" was used to search within *Nikkei Business*. The phrase appeared in 22 results from 1976 through 2010, of which it appeared in combination with the word "proclaimed" or "extolled" 9 times.
- 23 The third cycle after the war, peaking in June 1957 (from Cabinet Office "Reference Dates of Business Cycle" <http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/stat/di/111019hiduke.html>), is commonly called the Jinmu

boom. The Jinmu emperor is a mythical figure counted as the first Emperor of Japan. According to the *Asahi Shimbun* (Sept. 14, 1991), "There is no doubt that the late Yonosuke Goto was the one who brought up this mythical account to name the economy." As previously mentioned, Yonosuke Goto was also the author of the 1956 economic white paper. This name began to be used by the mass media about half a year after the economic white paper was announced. *Shukan Shincho* (Dec. 27, 1956: 26) writes, "this is the biggest economic boom since the days of Emperor Jinmu." The *Yomiuri Shimbun* says, "called 'the biggest boom since Jinmu'" (Dec. 29, 1956). Entering the new year, it becomes one word, "Jinmu boom" (*Asahi Shimbun* evening paper, Jan. 15, 1957).

24 For example, in the *Asahi Shimbun*, there have been no single articles carrying both the words "modernization" and "it is no longer 'postwar'" since 1985.

25 Here, reference was made to the high school Japanese history textbook, *Shosetsu nihonshi* (published by Yamakawa Shuppan), which is "by far the most popular text for university examinations" (Sato 2005: 248). According to the Library of Education, Educational Resources Research Center, National Institute for Educational Policy Research, the Yamakawa Shuppan textbook for Japanese History B had an adoption rate of 60.6 percent in 2012, far surpassing that of other publishing companies. ([http://crd.ndl.go.jp/reference/detail?page=ref\\_view&id=1000105641](http://crd.ndl.go.jp/reference/detail?page=ref_view&id=1000105641) (accessed Aug. 8, 2013)).

26 Up to the *Shosetsu nihonshi (saiteiban)* published in 1981, there was no reference to "it is no longer 'postwar'." It was first taken up in *Shosetsu nihonshi (shinban)* published in 1983, noting, "as termed in the 1956 economic white paper as 'it is no longer postwar,' this hard way of life was greatly lightened around this time" (343). The same words are seen in *Shosetsu nihonshi* published in 1988 (352). In *Shosetsu nihonshi* published in 2013 (approved by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in 2006), it was noted that, "Triggered by the Korean War, consumption, which indicates the people's living standards, also rose, and in 1956, the government's economic white paper noted that "it is no longer postwar" (370). Up to this edition, this phrase was not combined with the Jinmu boom.

27 It could be said that the same mechanism as Lippmann's stereotypes as defense are at work here. "They are an ordered, more or less consistent picture of the world, to which our habits, our tastes, our capacities, our comforts, and our hopes have adjusted themselves." "No wonder, then, that any disturbance of the stereotypes seems like an attack upon the foundations of the universe" (Lippmann 2004/1922: 52).

28 Gluck points out the importance of "comfort" in the continuance of memory, saying, "The reason why Japan continued to use the word 'postwar' was probably because this system was that stable. In other countries, we cannot find a word used in this kind of way. One reason for this is the United States. The United States "froze" the memories and systems of Japan. And for Japan, that was comfortable. Thanks to this, the emperor became a symbol, and a democratic and peaceful state continues to exist" (*Abeseiken to senso no kioku* [The Abe government and memory of war], *Asahi Shimbun*, Aug. 20,

2013).

In addition, in *Zohoshinban gendaisesofuzokushi nenpyo* [Chronology of current social conditions and customs] (Sesofuzoku kansatsukai ed. 2009:72), it is noted that, "within the 'life revolution' that began, this phrase sounded comfortable to the people." It interprets "it is no longer 'postwar'" as a "triumph" and seeks the reason for its acceptance in the sense of comfort.

- 29 For example, in *Nikkei Business*, the same or similar expression is used over the years: "The economic white paper extolled, 'it is no longer postwar'" (March 17, 1986: 89); "The economic white paper (1956) loudly proclaimed that 'it is no longer postwar'" (Nov. 24, 1986: 13); "The economic white paper loudly extolled that 'it is no longer postwar'" (Dec. 7, 1987: 144); "The economic white paper extolled that 'it is no longer postwar'" (March 18, 1991: 32); "'It is no longer postwar,' extolled the economic white paper" (April 10, 1995: 7); "'It is no longer postwar,' was extolled by the economic white paper" (April 18, 2005: 54); "The economic white paper proclaimed that 'it is no longer postwar'" (Nov. 27, 2006: 37); "The economic white paper loudly proclaimed that 'it is no longer postwar'" (Nov. 2, 2009: 128); and "'It is no longer postwar,' was extolled by the economic white paper" (Nov. 15, 2010: 54).
- 30 At times, misconceptions or conjectures of the journalist can pass through the editorial checking process and end up being printed. Although the direction of the words' meanings is in line with social memory, the account has been significantly reconstructed. However, this kind of article is like a bug in the process of reconstructing social memory, and does not appear to have an impact on further reconstruction. Let's look at two concrete examples: Although it is written, "1956, when the subtitle of the economic white paper extolled that 'it is no longer postwar'" (*Yomiuri Shimbun* Aug. 30, 1990), the subtitle of the white paper was "*Nihon keizai no seicho to kindai*" [The growth of Japanese economy and modernization]. In addition, it is noted, "the 1956 white paper begins with the words 'it is no longer postwar,' which became a fad phrase. It seems that the late Yonosuke Goto, who wrote the paper, thought up a lot of 'memorable phrases' while talking with newspaper reporters in order to raise popular interest in the economy" (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, Aug. 11, 1991), but "it is no longer postwar" did not appear in the beginning of the white paper (it was in the conclusion of Chapter I), and the words were taken from Nakano (Feb. 1956).
- 31 Individuals or groups select the necessary information from stored memory, and transfer this to functional memory to form recollections (Assmann 2007: 163-173).
- 32 Searches were conducted through Yomidasu Rekishikan (*Yomiuri Shimbun*), Kikuzou II Visual (*Asahi Shimbun*), Mainichi NEWS Pack (*Mainichi Shimbun*), Sankei Shimbun News Search Service (*Sankei Shimbun*), and Nikkei Telecom 21 (*Nikkei*).

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